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“The no-party democracy prevents ethnic conflicts” 
-President Museveni, Uganda- 
 
 
“I would like the West to give Africa some time to find their own way to 
Coca Cola” 
-Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania- 
 
 
“Donor countries should continue pressure on third world authoritarian 
regimes, for the sake of human rights” 
-Ali A. Mazrui, Professor Political Sciences- 
 
 
“Development requires democracy” 
-Bill Clinton in Beijing, President of the United States- 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This issue of Disaster Sites is devoted to the seminar “Democracy Under Fire. 
Governance and Intra-state Conflict”, held on November 19th 1998 in 
Wageningen. This report is the edited version of more than five hours of tape, 
recorded during the seminar. The report summarizes the lectures of the three 
keynote speakers; Raúl Rosende, program co-ordinator of the Organisation of 
American States,   Professor Kingsley de Silva, director of the International Centre 
for Ethnic Studies in Sri Lanka, and Achille M’Bembe, executive secretary of the 
Council for Development of Social Science Research in Africa in Senegal. Each 
lecture is followed by a discussion with a Panel and the audience. In the final 
chapter the editors1 of this report will give some brief concluding comments. 
 
With the end of the cold war, a new era was welcomed. It was believed a future 
dawned where ideological strife was obsolete, military conflicts rare, and liberal 
democracy the sole system of governance for all countries of the world. Hardly ten 
years later, this worldview has been overtaken by events. A situation has evolved 
where the number of current conflicts, mostly intra-state, is estimated at 155. What 
happens to governance in these cases? From various parts of the world, the 
‘universal’ concept of democracy is under fire. One bone of contention is the force 
and speed with which democracy is imposed on countries in the South. The 
analysis of intra-state conflict raises serious questions about governance and the 
role of the state. Upholding democratic institutions can contribute to peace making. 
On the other hand, the risk of democracy becoming void of meaning is also 
obvious in a number of cases. 
 According to Raúl Rosende, democracy is a conditio-sine-qua-non for 
peace building and development. He emphasises the important role the 
international community has played in conflict resolution in Central America. 
Kingsley de Silva is emphasising the success of the well-established British system 
in India and Sri Lanka. Although there are still conflicts in these countries, he 
rejects both the idea of authoritarian rule and intervention of the international 
community. M’Bembe stresses the need for an African system of governance and 
conflict resolution. Africa should no longer be governed by external initiatives.  
 In the discussion the state seems to gain ground compared to civil society. 
How and when does the state capacity need to be strengthened? Who is protecting 
us from the state? The relationship between civil society and the state needs to be 
closely looked at and be developed further.      
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9 
1. Introduction 
 
We will start with introducing the seminar and the participants of the event. The 
mayor of Wageningen, Mr. Jaap Sala, welcomes the guests and officially opens the 
seminar. Thea Hilhorst, the chair of the day, introduces the theme of the seminar 
by firing her first questions on conflicts and democracy 
 
 
About the seminar 
 
“Democracy under Fire”, the seminar about governance and intra-state conflict was 
organised by the student organisation OtherWise, Disaster Studies, Studium 
Generale and Educational Centre “Hotel de Wereld”. While intensively discussing 
the topic of the seminar during the preperations, Clingendael- the Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations- held a conference titled: “Intra-state conflict 
and options for policy “. Many respected politicians, scientists, and representatives 
from NGO’s, specialised on the topic of democratisation and conflict resolution 
participated in this conference. A number of the participants was invited to share 
their ideas with participants from Wageningen Agricultural University (WAU) and 
other interested persons.  
 
The first chapter contains the opening speech of the mayor of Wageningen and a 
brief introduction to the theme of the seminar. The subsequent chapters are edited 
proceedings of the presentations given by the three main speakers. In Raúl 
Rosende’s presentation the role of the international community in mediating as 
well as triggering conflicts in Central America is highlighted. This is followed by 
short comments from Kees Biekart. In the third chapter Kingsley de Silva explains 
the reasons for the relative success of democracy in South Asia, especially in Sri 
Lanka and India. Achille M’Bembe addresses the problems in Africa by 
questioning the Western concept of democracy and trying to find African 
responses to governance. Some final statements from the participants conclude the 
seminar. This is followed by some concluding comments of the editors. Jeroen de 
Zeeuw discusses the ambiguous role of the international community in recent 
conflicts in Central America. Gemma Vriens focuses on the efforts of Africans in 
dealing with topics such as democracy and other forms of governance. 
 
 
About the Participants 
 
Raúl Rosende is co-ordinator of several programmes of the Organisation of 
American States (OAS). The OAS is an intergovernmental organisation that is 
recognised by all governments in Central, South and North America. It has been 
created in 1948 and is currently carrying out activities in the field of peace making, 
peace keeping and peace building in different parts of Latin America. One of the 
tasks of the OAS is promoting and facilitating  democratisation in post-conflict 
situations in Central America, for example by organising elections. Raúl Rosende 
originally comes from Uruguay. He arrived in Central America in 1990 to work on 
the peace process in Nicaragua. Furthermore Raúl Rosende has been working in 
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peace-keeping missions in El Salvador and Guatemala. He will be focusing on 
strengthening the institutional capacity of the government and civil society in post-
war zones.     
 
Kingsley de Silva is the director of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies 
(ICES), based in Sri Lanka. He has been professor at the University of Ceylon and 
Peradeniya. He taught in the United States and Great Britain. The ICES institute 
where he is currently working was established in 1982. It is the only institution for 
the study of ethnic conflict in the whole of South Asia. He has written a large 
number of publications about post-independence governance, ethnicity, ethnic 
conflicts and multiculturalism in Sri Lanka and India.  
 
Achille M’Bembe is the executive secretary of the Council for Development of 
Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), based in Dakar, Senegal. He was 
born in Cameroon, studied in Paris and taught for nearly 10 years at the 
universities of New York and Philadelphia, USA. In 1997 he went back to Africa 
to join CODESRIA. This intergovernmental organisation is active in policy 
relevant social research, training and publication. 
 
Kees Biekart works at the Trans National Institute in Amsterdam. This is an 
international network of researchers. He has been working in Central America 
since the early 1980s, doing research related to peasant organisations and 
democratisation processes. He recently published a book on the role of NGO 
assistance in the process of democratisation in Central America.  
 
Jeroen de Zeeuw is a student member of OtherWise, Interdisciplinary Research 
and Education of Sustainable Development, a non-profit organisation formed by 
(former) students at the Wageningen Agricultural University. It focuses on 
development issues within education and research programmes at WAU. 
 
Jude Kehla works at the political-cultural centre De Balie in Amsterdam. Originally 
from Cameroon, he studied issues of democracy and intra-state conflict. 
Jude Kehla and Jeroen de Zeeuw form the panel, which will react to each 
presentation of the three speakers. 
 
Thea Hilhorst works at Wageningen Disaster Studies. This group studies issues of 
natural disasters, conflicts and humanitarian aid in the Third World. Thea Hilhorst 
chairs the seminar. 
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Opening speech by Jaap Sala 
 
Distinguished guests, dear ladies and gentlemen,  
As the mayor of the town of Wageningen I have the honour to open this seminar 
officially. The name of this seminar is “Democracy Under Fire”. Democracy is 
always vulnerable and needs continuous concern and care. Sometimes we have to 
come to its defence and there have been and unfortunately there are still many 
examples in which democratic rights of people have been taken away, or have been 
crushed by dictatorships and cruel regimes. Today we are going to discuss this issue 
with special reference to countries in the developing world.  I am indeed very happy 
that we have distinguished guests from that part of the world, who can share with us 
the very problems at stake. They also can inform us on how democracy could be 
protected in those places where it is functioning but at the same time at risk, for 
example through ethnic cleansing and violence. In other places the question is more 
how democracy can be restored. We also have to realise that democracy is basically a 
Western concept. Perhaps it needs some adjustments for situations with their own 
traditions of governance.  
Professor de Silva, Dr. M’Bembe and Mr. Rosende, you have all been 
involved, through your studies and your daily work, in the problems we are 
discussing today. It is a privilege to have you here as our main speakers. I am also 
honoured that Mrs. Oliver, representative of the Arias Foundation has been able to 
join us. Your experiences certainly will enrich our debate.  
 Though the focus of this debate will be on other parts of the world, it is also 
good to remember that Europe, including the town of Wageningen, has known the 
terror of war and violence. Wageningen was severely damaged and partly destroyed 
during the Second World War. Many people of Wageningen were killed or executed 
during the war. In this very building, negotiations took place between the allied forces 
and the Germans about the conditions for the German capitulation. The generals 
Foulkes and Kitching and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, negotiated here with 
the German general Blaskowitz. The negotiations took place on the 5th of May 1945 
and are still commemorated every year in front of this building. The signing of the 
capitulation took place one day later, on the 6th of May, next doors, in the building of 
the Agricultural University. In this former “Hotel De Wereld”, activities are being 
organised to discuss issues of peace, justice and human rights in the present day 
context.  
The historical role of this city and this very building in the ending of the 
Second World War gives an extra dimension to this discussion. We are aware that 
such issues need to be discussed time and again, to be put into the minds of each new 
generation. The presence of the Agricultural University and the active involvement of 
its staff and students facilitates this enormously. Many of these students are going to 
work in other parts of the world. They will be confronted by the questions and 
concerns addressed in today’s seminar. Again I would like to thank you very much 
for coming here in such a large number. It is indeed very encouraging to see that 
today’s topic does raise such an interest. I also would like to thank our distinguished 
foreign guests for coming to Wageningen, and I declare this seminar opened. 
 
Gemma Vriens and Jeroen de Zeeuw 
 
12
Introduction by Thea Hihorst 
 
The theme of this seminar is “democracy and intra-state conflict”. There are 
numerous intra-state conflicts in the world today. Many of these conflicts have to 
do with the failing of states and governance. Many of these conflicts centre around 
issues of people feeling that central governments are denying their identity, are 
discriminating against them or not allowing them any participation in governance. 
The themes of governance, intra-state conflicts and democracy are very closely 
related. Democracy is “under fire”. On the one hand, one can see democracy is on 
the agenda as never before. International institutions, including donor agencies, 
care about democracy. Consequently many developing countries experience all 
kinds of conditions, imposed upon them, that have to be fulfilled before they can 
actually avail of development aid: conditions regarding governance and their 
democratic institutions. On the other hand, one could say that democracy is indeed 
“under fire”. For one, because of the critique from different sides of the world that 
has been formulated against these policies of development institutions imposing 
governance and democratic institutions on countries all over the world. According 
to these critiques “The West” -to speak in those old-fashioned terms- imposes its 
own version of democracy on the rest of the world. The other thing is that 
democracy is not always functioning properly if one looks at the empirical reality. 
There are countries nowadays, where one can wonder whether there is any state at 
all. In some other countries, one can wonder what is behind the façade of 
democratic institutions. There are many questions to be raised. To start the seminar 
two particular issues will be highlighted.  
 The first issue concerns the right to put conditions on development aid 
programmes. At the Clingendael conference this week somebody said: “It is an 
irresponsible act, to give aid to governments which are involved in violent conflict, 
even if it is just neutral development aid. Development aid should not be given to 
countries that use violence or fail in governance”. Is it indeed an immoral act; is it 
irresponsible to give development aid to those countries where we feel 
governments do actually not comply with what the donor agency thinks is good 
governance? The second question relates to the nature of violent conflicts. Is 
conflict always a bad thing? Should policy always be focused on prevention, 
mitigation and resolution of conflict? Should that always be the first intervention in 
multilateral and bilateral dealings with governments before even thinking of other 
forms of stimulating development? These particular questions form the framework 
for today’s seminar. 
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2. Raúl Rosende: Foreign assistance in the peace 
process in Central America 
 
Raúl Rosende is the first guest of the seminar. In his view, the lack of state 
institutions has played an important role in the conflicts in Central America. 
Economic, technical, but most of all political international assistance is of crucial 
importance in establishing a lasting peace in Central America. Kees Biekart in his 
reaction to Rosende, is stating that the international community is not only playing 
a role in conflict resolution but also plays part in triggering conflicts.  
 
The peace process in Nicaragua was the first peace process in the region. Moreover it 
was the first peace process after the Cold War in the entire world. In Nicaragua the 
OAS carried out tasks referring to human rights verification, one of the most 
important activities in peace-keeping procedures. In Guatemala, monitoring activities 
concern peace building. The activities focus on, for example, strengthening the 
institutional capacity of the government and civil society in post-war zones. The OAS 
is also developing strategies addressing the former combatants (the guerrillas) of 
Guatemala.  
 There is a very broad range of activities referring to peace-making, -building 
and conflict resolution. Human rights verification, strengthening institutional capacity 
of state and civil society, integration of former combatants are only broad categories 
of activities. In addition, the importance of electoral observation should be stressed, 
not only in peace keeping, but also in the consolidation of the democratic process. 
The role the international community has played in Central America has been of 
crucial importance for peace and stability in the region. 
 Three basic levels of international co-operation in peace and conflict 
resolution processes will be discussed: economic assistance, technical assistance and 
political assistance.  
 Economic assistance implies basically the transference of funds from the 
international community to a particular country with the principal purpose of 
achieving recuperation of post-war zones. In Central America post-war territories 
generally have three very typical characteristics. First, these are the areas with the 
highest level of violence and with the worst standards of human rights. Second, the 
war zones have the highest level of poverty. Finally, the state is totally absent in these 
areas. These three characteristics, violence, poverty and lack of state institutions 
define the structure of conflict in Central America. The former two, violence and 
poverty can be the result of a lack of institutionalisation. They are directly linked to 
the causes of conflict, since they can serve as a trigger for war. International 
economic assistance can help mitigating these inflammable conditions. It can try to 
enhance the economic situation and to improve the social conditions of the people 
who live in war zones. Economic assistance can also help strengthening the 
institutional capacity (for example police, courts, electoral commissions) of the state.  
 Technical assistance may add to the little experience in reconstruction and 
conflict resolution Central American countries usually have. International 
organisations are in a better position to transfer experience and to enhance the 
capacity of the state to deal with the problems derived from the conflicts. 
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 In the third place there is political assistance. This is probably the most 
important field of activities of a peace-keeping and -building mission of an 
international organisation. It contains 1) negotiation and mediation, 2) dissuasion, and 
3) verification and observation.  
 
 1) Negotiations between the conflicting parties can take place more easily if 
facilitated by an international mediator. In the first place, the parties in conflict 
usually have more confidence in an outsider than in a third national party. In Central 
America the Catholic Church, being an insider, has often tried to play this mediating 
role but unfortunately failed. Having the support of a greater international 
community, an international organisation can also contribute enormously to 
legitimise peace processes. The international community is often able to neutralise 
internal forces that may oppose the peace process. Of course, opposition to peace is 
very common, and almost natural when a country is about to start developing a peace 
process. Usually not all the political forces in the country agree with the conditions of 
peace or with a certain peace agreement. International presence, then, can strengthen 
the legitimacy of the peace process. 
 2) An international intervention also has a dissuasive function. The presence 
of an international mediator discourages the conflicting parties to recommence 
fighting, since their actions against a peaceful resolution will be condemned and 
sanctioned by the international community. 
 3) The verification and observation tasks have to do with the fulfilment of 
commitments established by a peace treaty and the protection of human rights. The 
international presence in the most violent zones discourages the parties to violate 
human rights or non-compliance, since the international community is verifying their 
conduct. 
 
 
Kees Biekart: The role of the international community in 
conflicts in Central America 
  
Kees Biekart gives a detailed reaction to the presentation of Raúl Rosende. In the 
presentation above, the three basic causes of conflict in Central America mentioned 
were poverty, violence and the lack of state or institutionalisation.  
 The causes of war and conflict of the 1980s in Central America according to 
Biekart, in the first place have to do with economic restructuring policies. The 
economic modernisation that started after the Second World War was very export-
based. In this period of economic prosperity, wealth was distributed unequally; a 
small group benefited a lot. The large majority did not benefit from that period at all, 
particularly in these rural areas, where export produce like cotton, meat and coffee 
was produced. Profits could be made, to say it bluntly, through strong political 
pression, low salaries and in general social and political exploitation. When talking 
about causes of conflict in Central America this should be mentioned.  
 The causes of poverty can be directly attributed to the causes of the conflicts 
of the ‘80s in Central America, which were basically efforts to postpone the call for 
democracy. In the 1940s and 1950s there were movements advocating democratic 
rule in the region. The reaction from different regimes (supported by the United 
States) was basically to stop these democratic movements, often by military means. 
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In fact, there was a building up of military power. The military became the central 
authority. If one calls this violence, one can say that violence is a cause of war. 
 Social and political exclusion and militarisation of society do not per se point 
to a lack of state. The state in Central American countries existed, but it had the 
wrong kind of presence. The existence of a state by force is very undemocratic.  
 In the presentation above, three forms of international assistance in peace 
processes are mentioned. But what role was the international community actually 
playing? The majority of aid in the 1980s in Central America consisted of military aid 
that came from the United States! Over the past decade a huge amount of more than 
seven billion US dollars has been sent to governments throughout the region, 
especially Honduras and El Salvador, the majority of that assistance being used for 
military purposes. This, of course, had its aggravating effect on the domestic 
conflicts.  
 Of course the international community can contribute to a peace process, 
particularly in a diplomatic way. The United Nations have played a crucial role in 
mediating in El Salvador and Guatemala. The European governments have 
contributed also to give the Latin American governments and the OAS more room for 
manoeuvre by being a sort of counterweight to the US. However, the role of the 
international non-state community should not be underestimated. Churches, human 
rights organisations, non-governmental aid agencies and solidarity movements have 
been very important in Guatemala and El Salvador for putting the violation of human 
rights and the establishment of a truth commission on the political agenda. Civil 
society has also been very important in giving support to the opposition. All these 
forces have contributed to the transition from conflict to peace.   
 The transitions to democracy, economic liberalisation and peace have to be 
discussed in relation to each other. Economic transition, peace building and 
democratisation took place in more or less the same period. Democracy never existed 
in Central America prior to 1948, when the first democratic transition started in Costa 
Rica. Elections were held, but that is not the same as having a democracy. In El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua up to the 1980s there was no 
democracy. However, a start has been made towards a more democratic political 
system, even though there is not a consolidated democracy. The whole process of 
trying to incorporate citizens into decision-making and making the state more 
accountable, is still going on.  
 Finally, there is a problematic relationship between democracy and poverty. 
Extreme poverty is undermining democracy. The impoverished majority does not 
have confidence in the political system as they have seen it over the past years or they 
rely on clientelistic politics. In both ways, it is difficult to attain democratic change.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
Raúl Rosendeúl Rosendeúl Rosende 
South and Central America are very similar. Basically one can find the same social 
conditions: poverty, inequality, authoritarianism and a lack of democracy. 
Nevertheless, in Central America there has been war, whereas in South America there 
was not, at least not structurally. The structural social conditions being more or less 
equal, perhaps the basic causes of war can be found at the local level. At local level 
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differences between South and Central America are obvious. In the rural areas of 
Central America there is an absolute lack of state. If there is any state presence, it is 
weak and authoritarian, dominated by the military. Very often the army is the only 
state institution.  And even nowadays, the only state institution one can find in post-
war zones is the army. This is a central problem in Central America at the local level.  
 After the Cold War the international mechanisms have changed 
enormously. Of course international organisations, NGOs, churches, etc, have been 
playing an important role in the peace process in Central America. Co-operation of 
the international solidarity movements was very strong and very important. Over a 
long period of time the Central American countries have built up networks with 
NGOs in Europe and especially the US. Unfortunately the strength of these 
movements is decreasing at the moment. 
 
Audience 
It is questionable to say that democracy is the cure for poverty. Is there a direct 
correlation between the two? In Europe, Australia, and America, you can see an 
increase nowadays in the levels of poverty and a widening gap between the rich and 
the poor while these are so-called consolidated democracies. If you talk about 
democracies in terms of empowering local communities and giving them resources to 
improve their environment and livelihoods, yes that could perhaps be a cure for 
poverty. But democracy as an institutional solution for poverty is not very likely. 
Democracy is not just a procedure or a principle, democracy is also a practice. By this 
time we see an effort by the world community, including the Third World to accept 
the principle of democracy, but not the practice. 
 
Kees Biekart 
Poverty is undermining democracy, but that does not mean that one could solve the 
problem of poverty by establishing a democratic structure. 
 
Audience 
In Guatemala this issue is very different from other Central-American countries, 
because of the existence of an ethnically pluriform society. How do we construct 
democracy while respecting ethnic differences? The issue of collective rights comes 
into the picture. People try to manufacture some sort of system that respects 
differences. Most popular organisations in Guatemala did not opt for a ministry of 
indigenous people, but for insertion of indigenous people and other ethnic groups 
within the very broad political system.  
 
Raúl Rosendeúl Rosendeúl Rosende 
The only country with an important ethnic differentiation in Central America is 
Guatemala. El Salvador and Nicaragua for example are mestizo countries. Guatemala 
has an indigenous majority. It has the same characteristic as some Andean countries, 
like Bolivia, and Ecuador. If one refers to conflict in Guatemala, one should refer to 
poverty, lack of state, and to discrimination of ethnic groups.  
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Kees Biekart 
In Guatemala the issue of collective rights is of crucial importance. Without having it 
made one of the key issues in the negotiations, the Guatemalan peace process would 
never have come this far. The negotiations about the Indian rights agreement were the 
heart of the peace accords. Everybody knew that if there was an outcome that was not 
acceptable to the Indian majority of Guatemala, there would be no point in even 
thinking about conflict resolution, peace processes or democratisation. Up till that 
very moment Indians had been totally and legally excluded from the Guatemalan civil 
society. For its implementation, however, the Indian rights agreement needs 
international support. 
 
Audience 
Raúl Rosende focussed his presentation on conflict resolution and the role of the 
OAS. International assistance should focus on poor post war zones in the rural areas. 
Kees Biekart on the other hand, was talking about the causes of conflict. These are 
different subjects that have to be separated. 
 
Thea Hilhorst  
We cannot just separate all the causes of conflict and its resolution. Kees Biekart 
questioned the role of the international community. How intra-state is intra-state 
conflict? If one thinks about the international community as a conflict resolver, it is 
easy to forget that the international community can also be part of the cause of the 
conflict, especially in the case of giving military aid.  
 
Audience 
What makes people go into conflict? If we know the answer, this might give us some 
guidance on how people can live together peacefully. Then we can start talking about 
democracy or about other instruments.  
 
Raúl Rosendeúl Rosendeúl Rosende 
Research with former combatants in Nicaragua and El Salvador, pointed in the 
direction of large ideas such as lack of democracy and poverty. Most former 
combatants are very poor peasants, living in the poorest parts of the countries. This is 
the social profile of Sandinistas and Contras and state armies alike. The particularity 
in Guatemala is that these peasants are indigenous. The zones where production is 
structured, is not strictly capitalistic, it is pre-capitalistic. There is no combatant who 
came from the capitalist zones of these countries. Lack of all kinds of basic resources 
move people to go to war. 
 
Audience 
But who is starting a conflict? Is it the people or their leaders? In India, for 
example, Mahatma Gandhi mobilised poor people for reconciliation. Poverty is not 
always ending in conflict. Elite leaders use the poor people to support them, to be 
able to stay in a powerful position.   
 What we are using as a remedy for a conflict does not always address the 
causes. Raúl Rosende stated that more than 95% of the combatants in conflicts in 
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Nicaragua and El Salvador were peasants. This can be seen as a rejection of a 
development model oriented towards the few rich in the country, rather than 
towards the majority of the population. The majority in these countries was 
probably left out of this model of development. Democracy can be part of the cure, 
but not the total medication. Conflicts are also linked to models of economic 
development and solutions should also be sought there.  
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3. Kingsley de Silva: The success of democracy in South 
Asia 
 
Kingsley de Silva is emphasising the success of the well-established democracies 
based on the British system in India and Sri Lanka. Democracy, according to de 
Silva, does not require a high standard of living. Although there are still conflicts 
in India and Sri Lanka, he rejects both the ideas of authoritarian rule and 
(conditional) assistance by the international community. The discussion focused on 
the relationship between democracy, (including lower caste mobility) and the 
prevalence of conflicts. Are enduring conflicts in South Asia a by-product of 
democracy? Are they merely imperfections of a weak functioning state or should 
they be seen as a test for the success of democracy? 
 
South Asia is, of course, a very different place from Latin America. It is an area in 
which the state is alive and well. States in this area did not fail. However, they do find 
it difficult to cope with a number of problems. South Asia, whatever the definition of 
democracy, has a reputation of having established democratic forms of governance. 
This is certainly the case in Sri Lanka and India. Looking at South Asia in the early 
1950s, there were only two democracies: Sri Lanka and India. At the moment almost 
every country in South Asia, including Nepal, has some form of democratic 
governance.  
 We will first take a historical perspective by looking at these different forms 
of governance in South Asia. The roots of democracy in South Asia go back to 
British times. Whatever else one may say about British rule, the fact of the matter is 
that wherever you look at the ex-colonial world and you find democracies, you will 
find that the bulk of them are ex-British colonies. The roots of the democratic 
structures -such as representation of local people in the national legislature, 
representation, first by nomination and thereafter by small electoral systems- were 
established in British times.  
 The position of Sri Lanka was unique. In 1928 the British State started to 
introduce a form of representative governance in the colony. This was a revolutionary 
step. Representative governance before independence means coming to terms with 
universal suffrage. Universal suffrage came to Sri Lanka in 1931. It was an amazing 
development at that time. It meant that all men and women at the age of 21 were 
qualified to vote. Women in Sri Lanka had the right to vote long before women in for 
example France, Belgium or Switzerland. That was a revolutionary step taken by the 
British, a very pragmatic decision to compel the political elite to look at the problems 
of the people.  
 That was the first step. To put this decision in perspective you have also to 
remember that the very first British election under universal suffrage came in 1929, 
universal suffrage came to India only in 1952. In Sri Lanka the bulk of the 
population, some 70 % was illiterate, and having elections was something quite 
revolutionary. The second salient fact was that Sri Lanka had three general elections 
before independence. The adaptation of universal suffrage did not come because the 
Sri Lankan elite wanted it. It came despite the Sri Lankan elite. 
 The response of the elite to universal suffrage, had in fact a negative impact 
on the system. They appealed to people on the grounds of ethnicity and religion. In 
that appeal lay the roots of some of our current problems. Nevertheless, there was 
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also a constructive part of that appeal. From 1936 to 1947 more than half the budget 
was spent on three major sectors of expenditure. First of all, primary, secondary and 
tertiary education was funded entirely by the state. In Southeast Asia, Sri Lanka has 
the highest levels of primary and secondary schools. Second, the state invested in 
public health. Third we witnessed a relatively high expenditure on food subsidies in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the diversion of resources to the military in the last ten 
years, the proportion of money spent on education and public health has continued 
unabated. Statistics show a literacy rate of 92 % and a life expectancy for men of 72 
and 76 for women. Infant mortality has dropped to 11 per 1000 live births. It is the 
cumulative effect of a decision taken by the British in 1928 to install universal 
suffrage.  
 The other part of the story relates to India. Despite the horrors of the 
establishment of a democratic system in India from 1947 onwards, they did things the 
British never attempted to do, in bringing the princely states together into one 
uniform state structure. One of the features of British rule, despite all constructive 
effects it had, was the fact that there were periodic famines. The last of these took 
place in 1942-1943, a period during which food was available, but the British were 
unable to distribute it. Whatever the reasons, this last major famine in Bengal led to 3 
à 4 million deaths. Deaths by starvation, while food was available in the stores. 
Whatever defects exist in Indian democracy and although poverty is still a serious 
problem, India has not seen another large-scale famine after independence. 
  This is the feature that the Nobel laureate Sen has pointed out, by comparing 
India and China. He attributes the difference to the fact that India is operating a 
democracy where people are able to intervene in instances such as this.  
 The difficulties, however, that both India and Sri Lanka have, can be ascribed 
to two major processes. On the one hand they are trying to run a democratic 
government and at the same time they are engaged in the process of state building. In 
India that process has been much more difficult than in Sri Lanka. In the 18th century 
this process of state building was already a very violent process. If you look at 
violence and elements of instability in India today you have to remember that they are 
trying to do something now which has never been attempted by the British during the 
entire colonial period. Nevertheless, one cannot assume that democracies could be 
run without conflict. Democracies are as prone to conflict as any other form of 
governance. Both in Sri Lanka and in India there are very high levels of violence. 
Those levels of violence, however, have been a feature of the 1970s and 1980s, not of 
the past. In fact the transition to independence, both in India and Sri Lanka, was very 
orderly in the first 10 years.  
 The second point is that both these countries with quite stable democracies 
have refuted most of the Western theories about the fundamental requisites of 
establishing a democracy. Whether you read Robert Dahl or Barrington Moore, they 
all assume a high level of economic prosperity and development as essential and even 
as prerequisites to the success of a democracy. In a recently published book it was 
stated that “bad economic performance in poor countries makes democracy 
particularly vulnerable. In a declining democracy of less than $1,000 GNP democracy 
can be expected to last on an average of four years”. Now, if this were the criterion 
used, a lot of countries in South Asia would not be able to develop a democracy. Sri 
Lanka has a per capita income of $800 GNP, and India less than half of that. And yet 
they have sustained a form of democracy on that basis. Therefore, it is a challenge, 
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which many Western societies have found impossible to accept or even imagine that 
on such a level of mass poverty it is possible to sustain a two party system in which 
you have regular elections. Surely these elections may sometimes lead to violence, 
but after all South Asia is not the only part in the world where elections have been 
fraudulent; the same goes for large parts of the so-called developed world. However 
the response in Southeast Asian countries to these fraudulent elections has been 
remarkable. India, for instance, has an election committee, which is now being 
regarded as a model for the Western world. Great Britain recently said that we have to 
look at India’s Election Commission to see ways in which it can be possible to handle 
some of the problems of Western democracy, like the use of money in elections 
coming from various sources. Moreover, the Indian Election Commission also 
insisted on inner-party democracy. They compelled ministers for instance to account 
for the money they used for running an election campaign.  
 The failure of democracy in our part of the world has been the inability to 
cope with ethnic conflict. In Sri Lanka you would say that it is a matter of a 
privileged minority fighting for its declining privileges. In India, it is the whole issue 
of class. The fact of the matter is that democratic structures have been unable to cope 
with these pressures. That is the principal flaw of South Asian democracy. It is not a 
hopeless failure, however. On the contrary, I would argue that the levels of violence 
have been less than in many other parts of the world. 
 Looking at the experience of Asia I would argue that if you want to have 
economic growth you have to have some form of authoritarian rule. If you look at 
South Korea, Singapore or even Malaysia where people have a much higher standard 
of living than in India or Sri Lanka, it has had a certain price. The price has been 
terrifying in countries like South Korea. Singapore has transformed itself from being 
the slum of Southeast Asia to a First World state. A First World state, however, 
without a first world democracy. Malaysia also has given its people a remarkable 
level of prosperity, whatever the problems they have at the moment. One visit to 
Malaysia will give you an idea of how much can be done by one man in political 
power for ten or fifteen years. This is not the record of India or Sri Lanka. In 1961 Sri 
Lanka had the same per capita GNP as South Korea, twice the GNP of Thailand. In 
Sri Lanka and India the economic successes have been postponed, maybe for 
investing more time and effort in more democratic political structures. Whatever the 
ideology, the fact remains that there are high levels of inefficiency and corruption in 
India. And it is only now that India is making small improvements in its performance.  
 Still one question remains. What should be the role of the international 
community in dealing with countries in crisis? My answer is simple: we cannot assist 
India. India is too proud to accept any assistance, and will tell you to go fly a kite. 
They have said that more than once. India is too big to accept the sort of 
conditionalities that the IMF imposes. The smaller democracies like Sri Lanka have 
learned the game, and the name of the game is simple: turn to Japan, the principal aid 
donor now. As far as the IMF and the World Bank are concerned, it is necessary to 
negotiate with the American government. That is exactly what is happening in India 
and our part of the world today. In a few years time there will be another player in the 
aid-game: the Peoples Republic of China. They will generate a surplus which will be 
available for South Asia and Southeast Asia. Moreover they will have a political 
agenda which will have nothing to do with democracy anymore.  
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Comments by Jeroen de Zeeuw and Jude Kehla, panel 
 
Jeroen de Zeeuw 
Although the developments sketched above all sound rather positive, it is also a 
fact that there are still many violent conflicts in the South Asian region. An 
important question in this respect could be if these conflicts can be a sign of too 
little or even too much democracy. We should also ask ourselves if political 
empowerment through the process of democratisation is an adequate instrument for 
addressing the issues of inequality and the integration of ethnic minority groups in 
the state system.  
 Secondly, attention should be drawn to other successful mechanisms of 
power sharing in the history of South Asia. Were there any other types of 
governance before the British colonial period, from which we can draw experience 
to deal with conflicts in today’s plural societies?  
 
Jude Kehla, Panel 
Apart from certain similarities between Sri Lanka and India, we should be careful 
comparing two very different countries, which both need a very different sort of 
analysis. Furthermore, it is important to include groups, like the Untouchables and 
pariah communities and topics such as dynastic rule in the analysis of these countries. 
 A second thing is the big impact by doing small things. The implementation 
of school milk in Sri Lanka e.g. has probably contributed more to health care in such 
a poor country than most foreign aid that has been sent to African countries in a 
ten-year period. This says something about the possibilities of a ruling class 
actually recognising what the basic needs of people are.  
 Focus should also be laid on the conclusion that economic growth is 
impossible to achieve without some form of authoritarian rule. This seems to be a 
tendency in most of Southeast Asia, where the state or the ruling elites are not 
challenged. Nowadays in attempts to solve crises in the international monetary 
market, it can be seen that in these countries there is an incredible redistribution of 
resources away from poor people, through taxes, to elites who have mismanaged 
the system through the banks and large corporations that are almost intertwined 
with the state.  
 
Kingsley de Silva 
The question of dynasty indeed is important, especially during some episodes of Sri 
Lankan history. Here we have one family which has controlled one political party. 
From the time it was established in 1951 to the present day, it still has public support. 
On the other hand, we can see also that the political system has been opened up more 
and more by the opposition. President Premadasa, for example, belonged to a very 
low caste. His appointment was the first time in hundreds and hundreds of years that 
a person from that caste became the head of government and the head of state. In 
India you had the three-generation leadership by one family. Nevertheless, these are 
democracies, which permit the survival of this sort of families. In the case of Nehru it 
is the point of credibility and acceptance they have. This comes essentially from the 
whole decade of India’s experience with the British. Before that it was Nehru’s father 
and his colleagues, which comprised two centuries of collaboration, first with the 
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Dutch and then with the British. Then they suddenly became democrats, and actually 
succeeded. They succeeded in presenting themselves as populist democrats, 
introducing a level of populism, which undermined the economic system by e.g. 
generating strikes.  
 India is generally coping very well with the important question of castes. 
Much of the instability in India today, yet derives from the fact that lower castes, or 
so-called Untouchables, are up in arms and trying to gain access to the political 
system. This is a very ugly process, because they have taken a corrupt system and 
made it much more corrupt. The more constructive part of it is that India’s present 
president belongs to the lowest of the lowest in the caste system. To that extent it is a 
demonstration that the system has really opened up and that the elite of the Brahmans 
will not automatically be able to dominate India’s political system 
 
Jude Kehla 
This is just symbolic. We have to be critical about the value of having someone from 
a lower caste as prime minister without anything sipping down in terms of welfare 
and social and economic opportunities. You can act in a soap opera or whatever is 
famous in India and on the basis of that get an amount of reverence which permits 
you to go to parliament. What is the quality of this kind of democracy?  
 
Kingsley de Silva 
Although this is true, we have to recall that a great filmstar was president of the 
United States! The processes in which the lower castes are coming to power are an 
important reason for India having such an unstable political system. All over India, 
the issue now is the upward mobility of the lower castes. It is not only violence that is 
coming up, but also corruption. People from the lower castes assume that the state 
belongs to them, and given the ineffectiveness of the Supreme Court and the legal 
system in India, it will probably take more than fifty years before you can 
successfully prosecute one of those guys. The point is that India’s political system has 
recently been democratised in a way it was not democratised under the Nehrus. The 
process is not very pretty, but still, there is genuine affirmative action on behalf of 
these people. Therefore, the democratisation process in India is flourishing, but it has 
certain ugly features, features which will become more prominent over the next 
fifteen, twenty years. The problem is that now we cannot go back to the days of the 
Nehrus anymore. 
 
Jeroen de Zeeuw  
As we have learned from the presentation, the roots of democracy go back to British 
times. What was there before that time? It could not only be anarchy and chaos? Was 
there not any other sort of governance, which also functioned?  
 
Kingsley de Silva  
There were monarchical forms of governance, with their own systems of getting the 
allegiance of the people. However, these were not very democratic. It is very 
comforting for Indian and Sri Lankan academics that we can say that we had forms of 
democracy prior to British rule. There were forms of democracy at the local level, the 
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village, but when it comes to structures bigger than the village, it would take a very 
bold man who could say that there was democracy. What the Sri Lankan and Indian 
politicians did was taking up the challenge which the British threw out. From abroad 
the assumption right through was that these guys cannot run a democratic system, and 
in a way it has come true. At the same time you could argue that they ran the system 
under very difficult circumstances. There were no democratic systems, which had 
wide prevalence over wide regions or empires, but there was democracy at village 
level. You have to remember that the glue that held this system together at the local 
level was the caste system. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Audience 
Do we really need democracy? Why should democracy not be on fire?  
 
Kingsley de Silva 
The question if we really need democracy is not something we bring into question. 
The fundamental fact is that whoever rules a country has to have some level of 
legitimacy. One form of gaining this legitimacy is obtaining popular acceptance in 
elections. To that extent we cannot exclude democracy. We cannot raise the question 
whether we need democracy, it is a given. The problem is that we have to make it 
creative, to distribute the benefits to the people at large. Those benefits have come. 
Both in Sri Lanka and in India there have been systematic social changes, and it has 
come from below. Governments and social structures will have to adjust to that. 
Social change in Sri Lanka for instance has come through the government-induced 
education system. Social welfare from the part of the government and the ability of 
people to come up to that process and challenge the rulers. What is still lacking is 
inner party democracy, the lack of which keeps the dynasty in power. The second 
thing is to protect the civil and political rights to a much greater extent than what we 
have succeeded in doing. These civil and political rights survive during periods of 
peace, but when there is tension, ethnic and religious conflicts, the state tolerates 
levels of violence which no state should tolerate. Especially in putting down armed 
rebellions, even rebellions which are not very well-armed. That is the crisis of 
democracy. In those instances, if you call independent Indian lawyers, part of civil 
society, they will demonstrate the effectiveness of the legal system. In India, under 
jurisdiction, there is the right to compel the police to arrest somebody. However 
powerful that person might be, if the Supreme Court orders the police to arrest that 
man, to bring him before court, it is done. There are cases where the Supreme Court 
has ordered the state government to investigate high levels of corruption. At the 
moment there is an Indian former prime minister on trial for corruption. There are not 
many countries in which that will happen.  
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Jude Kehla 
Sri Lanka is a very good example of an intra-state conflict which is armed and very 
violent. But what are the reasons for this intra-state conflict. There must be something 
wrong with the state as it is. There must be something wrong with the ability of state 
institutions to stand between conflicting parties.  
 
Kingsley de Silva 
It has been the failure of the state to deal effectively with the problem of minorities. It 
is complicated by the fact that it is to a certain degree an inter-state conflict as well. 
Both in India and Sri Lanka it is the failure of the elite to understand some of the 
problems that have led to these problems. Now, the difficulty in dealing with an 
armed conflict in parts of Sri Lanka is partly because there are some measures that the 
state cannot take because of fear of reprisals; if not from India, than from Tamils. It 
becomes complicated when another democracy intervenes in the affairs of a 
neighbouring state.  
 
Thea Hilhorst 
It is interesting to see that the discussion focuses on the question whether conflict 
is simply the effect of a weakness of democracy or if it should be seen as the 
ultimate test of democracy.  
 
Audience 
The issue of human and cultural rights has not been mentioned yet. Especially the 
question of cultural rights is important here. In parts of the world like Australia and 
New Zealand people are confronted with the problem of having dual sovereignty 
within a nation-state. This seems to be an equally important question in Sri Lanka 
and India, with the Tamils and the Sikhs. 
 
Kingsley de Silva 
There is much greater recognition of cultural rights in India and Sri Lanka than 
people might think. In India the Muslims in a political form first challenged the 
question of cultural rights. The prolonged conflict over that eventually led to the 
partition of India. But ever since that, India has found it extremely difficult in 
coming to terms with the whole issue of cultural rights. The Sikhs e.g. , in raising 
the issue of cultural rights, have found it extremely difficult to separate those rights 
from religious rights. The Sikhs have a right there, because they refuse to be 
recognised as a sect of the Hindu religion. The state argues that they form a sect of 
the Hindu religion. In that case the question of religion has come into the picture as 
well, and has led to problems. A problem which can often be seen in India as well 
as in Sri Lanka, is that the minority which challenges the majority does not itself 
practice the same rights whenever they are in power. Despite all the violent 
conflict Sri Lanka has had, the only instance of ethnic cleansing was when the 
Tamils threw out the whole Muslim community in the Northern Province. Those 
people now live as refugees among the Singhalese, unable to get back.  
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 As we can see, until now we have not been able to devise an effective way 
in handling that sensitive problem of cultural rights. This is also where the question 
of religion comes in. In Sri Lanka there is basically no problem on the part of 
cultural rights, because it is multi-cultural society. It is a society, which has a long 
tradition of religious tolerance. Sri Lanka is unique in the whole of South Asia in 
facing the intolerance of Christianity. Christianity, which came to Sri Lanka 
through the Portuguese and the Dutch, brought with it the aspect of religious 
intolerance in Europe. Therefore the battles of the Reformation and 
Counterreformation were fought in Sri Lanka. People were not permitted to 
practice Indian indigenous religions. Temples were destroyed and churches were 
constructed. The memory of that still survives. And yet while that happened in one 
part of the country, in the other part Roman Catholics were permitted entry and 
permitted the right to build churches. Muslims were thrown out of the Portuguese 
areas and were allowed to relocate in the Singhalese area. As far as cultural rights 
are concerned, if it includes religious rights, it includes the right to use your 
language in schools and universities, you have it all. Arguing that those rights are 
disregarded in our part of the world is unfair. 
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4. Achille M’Bembe: The African experience. In search of 
an alternative 
 
Achille M’Bembe pleads for a new paradigm needed to understand the African 
situation. This new framework could assist in putting up systems of governance 
based on African experiences. The discussion focused on the multiplicity of forms 
of governance and external intervention on the continent. 
 
Two sets of remarks will be made. The first set of remarks will be an attempt of 
characterising the present moment we live in Africa today. It is an attempt at least 
in highlighting some of what seem to be fundamental issues African societies are 
struggling with. Of course, Africa is not homogeneous or monolithic, the continent 
has a plural character. This presentation should be taken as a way of organising the 
discussion. The second set of remarks will be an attempt to start developing a new 
paradigm that is needed to study Africa’s present day society. 
Several major processes are going on today, which force us to rethink both the 
African identity (who we are, where we come from, and where we want to go) and 
the role Africa plays in the world. Basic questions of identity receive their 
translation into debates about democratisation, conflict resolution and economic 
transformation. Democracy, conflicts and economic transformation refer to basic 
issues of what a political community is or should be, and under what conditions 
people can construct a social life.  
 Under what conditions are societies societies? Under what conditions do 
they stop being societies and do they fall into some other state? For example a state 
of war or a state of nature. Behind the whole rhetoric of crises, the terrible media 
images show the dramatic Africa. That is just one part of the picture. Beyond the 
media images, important processes of social change are going on, affecting life in 
those societies. We have witnessed in the last twenty five years major changes in 
social formations and coalitions.  
To understand the dynamics of these societies today, we need to look at 
their history. What did these societies become since independence? First, one can 
see for example a rapid urbanisation: African cities with an African character are 
appearing and growing fast. Second, Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
have become a major feature of economic policy on the continent over the last 
fifteen years. Third, important changes are going on in terms of organisations; 
institutions and societies develop to streamline relations between the group and the 
individual. A reactivation of all kinds of forms of social organisation and 
rehabilitation of older practices (in terms of health management, or rotating credit 
associations) has taken place. A social memory that has always been there, despite 
having been suppressed by the post-colonial state, could make this revival of older 
practices possible. They have been waiting in the back-stage, being reactivated 
today, for purposes of coping with contemporary hardship. Fourth, one can see 
changes going on in terms of consciousness, fostered both by religious 
organisations and the proliferation of churches. Their work tends to give people a 
sense of self, of who they are. This sense of identity, of purpose, of inscription in 
the contemporary framework, goes beyond the here and now. Religion becomes a 
locus of reinvention of the social link, of the self, of the nation, of the community, 
including a reinvention of what the world is all about. Religious movements are 
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providing people a way of making sense out of what otherwise would make no 
sense at all.  
This very brief and incomplete sketch of African society today however 
indicates that there are a lot of complex processes going on, that are important in 
any attempt to understand what is going on in Africa today. These processes 
cannot be reduced to the pictures we see on TV. Some changes are very dramatic, 
others are very creative. Africa experiences an important moment of social 
experimentation, which has positive sides and negative ones.  
The second important point of this presentation has to do with the current absence 
of a clear idea for an alternative to the present situation. An explicit vision of what 
a good African society should be is not yet fully developed. The debates on 
democracy are part of those attempts at formulating a vision. The intellectual 
frameworks that are at hand, the categories used, fail to account for such complex 
realities and take the simplistic versions of neo-classical, Marxist or nativists 
paradigms. The nativist paradigm attempts to believe that there is something like 
an African tradition, which has always been there. One just has to rediscover it and 
exploit it in order to make sense of the present. None of these paradigms is offering 
a fundamental basis out of which an alternative for present day crises could 
possibly be formulated. Until this present moment, the task of rediscovering 
fundamental values necessary for societies to have a certain level of cohesion, has 
been taken care of in a very trial and error way.  
If we talk about democracy, we talk about regulating a society by putting in 
place mechanisms which first of all protects life against forces of death, whatever 
forms those forces take. Second they have to heal life where it is hurt. A 
democratic system is more likely to do this than a system where brutality and 
abuse of human rights are everyday practice. At a time when people die so easily, 
we have to start from that basic distinction between life and death, and develop 
both a political and an ethical reflection on the fundamentals. Fundamentals in the 
ways societies organize themselves, and emerge as communities. 
Therefore a new paradigm to study the African complexity is needed. In the 
attempt to do this, violence is one of those things that requires our intellectual and 
political attention. This means not only referring to the various (intra-state) 
conflicts in Africa, one should also take into account the (economic) violence 
inflicted upon those societies by market forces. After fifteen to twenty years of 
structural adjustment programs the social fabric has been dismantled and the states 
have been weakened. Structural adjustment disintegrated social structures at least 
in certain parts of the continent and consequently paved the way for anarchy, 
which, in itself has brought new forms of violence Africa was not used to. This 
‘new violence’ is inflicting on those societies a human cost only comparable to 
what happened in the time of the slave trade. Within that context, the poor, those 
who are the most vulnerable segments of society, are paying a high price in the war 
of economics, inflicted by market forces. Within that context it seems to me that 
any attempt of imagining a good alternative vision of where we want to go, should 
begin from a reflection on the distinction between these basic categories: life and 
death. 
Part of that new paradigm should also be concentrated on the relationship 
between the individual and the community. What we have witnessed during the 
last twenty years is that certain aspects of economic life are emphasising the 
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polarisation between the individual and the community whereas African societies 
generally have managed, over a long period of time, to establish a certain 
complementarity between the individual and the community. This complementarity 
has proved to be necessary to survive in the fragile environments in the tropics; 
fragile environments where you are never really sure that you have built something 
in an irreversible manner, where the gains of today are always likely to be reversed 
tomorrow. That complementarity, the equilibrium between the community and the 
individual, has helped to make sure that the dangers of big polarisation between 
those two elements was not mortal to many African societies. If the increasing gap 
between individual and community interests is not managed properly, we will give 
way for the new kind of violence we were talking about at the beginning of this 
seminar.  
 
 
Comments of Jeroen de Zeeuw and Jude Kehla, the panel 
 
Jeroen de Zeeuw 
Different processes of identity are outlined: where we come from, where we want 
to go and who we are. Africa has a lot of countries with different identities and 
cultural values. Do you think democracy is the best system of governance that 
caters for all these differences? Or are there other forms of governance, apart from 
Western liberal democracy, that have come to the fore in African history, and that 
have shown their value in successfully incorporating different political ideas into 
one government structure? Julius Nyerere, formulated this in a different way:  “I 
would like the West to give Africa some time to find their own way to Coca-Cola”.  
 
Jude Kehla  
I question the idea that disintegration of social structures is a result of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes or market forces. The disintegration we see at the 
moment in Rwanda, does that have to do with SAPs? Furthermore I want to make 
some comments on the African situation as a whole. Identification with the group 
in my opinion means a substantial loss of personal identity. Some conflicts today 
have their basis in tribal identification. The tribe as it is nowadays might be part of 
the problem. I believe that if the tribe had been given the opportunity to develop, it 
might have had come into conflict with itself earlier than the colonial state. The 
tribes therefore have searched for different kind of solutions to solve their own 
problems. The modern state however intervened into that history of tribes which 
are still developing. What is needed now is good leadership. The question remains 
however what kind of characteristics these good leaders should have.  
 
Achille M’bembe 
The West has been interfering in African affairs for as long as we know. Africa has 
been contained and instrumentalised, used for personal political gains. At the level 
of the elites, there has been a system of penetration between the West and Africa. 
You can see penetration that is quite gross, or colonial, but there are also more 
sophisticated forms exercised through market forces. You can also see a 
penetration by exploitation of basic strategic minerals, of diamonds, oil, timber etc. 
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The wars in Congo-Brazzaville or Angola, for example have been going on for a 
long time now. This penetration brings together local African actors with 
transnational actors, around a whole web of simulation where disorder is created. 
The easiest way to make a profit today is through creating chaos. Where you create 
chaos you get more profit and at a quicker pace, then where you have so-called 
market economies. Therefore, there is a contradiction between the policies of 
international financing institutions, such as the Worldbank and IMF, trying to set 
the prices right, and the real logics of these societies that go absolutely against 
those processes. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Audience 
Africa is a continent that is no longer for Africans. It is a treasure for the entire 
world. Recent conflicts are fought around goldmines. “All people get the 
governments they deserve”. Blaming everything on the colonial past doesn’t help, 
let’s move forward. 
 
Achille M’bembe 
In Africa there has always been a multiplicity of forms of government and 
philosophies that changed over time. Chiefdoms, or social orders that were 
regulated in the absence of the state. One did not need a state, or prisons. One 
hardly needed a  bureaucracy. These were societies that have been able to invent 
forms of self- management, which responded constantly to what was perceived as 
the demands of their times. In the big variety of African identities the concept of 
political life -or of democracy- needs to be reconceptualised, reinvented, according 
to local conditions. African post-colonial governments always used to say: 
“Democracy okay , but African democracy”, by which they meant a delusion of the 
fundamental principles of democratic rule. These advocating democracies turned 
away from contextualisation or indigenisation of democratic forms.  
 
Audience 
Problems in Africa cannot be dislodged from slavery and colonialism. Africa has 
had a rich history with a variety of forms of governance. Forms of governance, or 
democracy that were interrelated with religion and other aspects of social life. 
Before colonisation there was no death sentence, no prisons. We deny ourselves 
too much; we adapt ourselves too much to western philosophies. Implementing 
Western models of democracies in Africa is like trying to put a square object in a 
round hole. 
 
Achille M’bembe 
Talking about liberalisation of markets and SAPs is of course, not the only thing 
what is going on today. Nevertheless salaries have not been paid to government 
officials and soldiers. The changes in economic policies have considerably affected 
the way countries are governing. Regimes used to buy obedience. They may have 
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been authoritarian, using coercion, but they did have some form of legitimacy. At 
least they brought some form of stability and they were able to control violence 
between more or less reasonable limits. At the moment that basis is no longer 
present. There is potential for individuals to privatise public violence. The potential 
to exercise forms of coercion, taxation, to control the central bureaucracy or to put 
their hands on critical resources, within a problem context which is precisely 
favourable for deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation. This situation is not 
conducive for harmonious relations in society. It is in this context that issues of 
identity and ethnicity gain prominence, and are mobilised and politicised by 
various actors who are not necessarily looking for the common good. 
 
Audience 
Whatever the history, every place needs a leader. One also needs the vision to 
establish democracy and power sharing, which in itself is a system that can put 
aside the leader. Often leaders do not want to share power and then they need will 
need violence to exercise it. I think we have to get rid of our romantic picture about 
African traditions. Let’s not forget the black periods. One of the problems now is 
that there is no link between the elites and the local people. For who is democracy?  
 
Achille M’bembe 
The debate on the past (slavery and colonialism) is framed in a context of guilt and 
blame. There should be other ways in coming to terms with the past and connect 
with the present. We have to find those ways. Colonial rule took only one century, 
nevertheless, it managed to transform societies in a structural way. At the end of 
colonial rule these societies were neither what they were before, nor what 
colonialism wanted them to be. They were some forms of hybrid formation and a 
multiplicity of legal systems, with a variety of norms. There is a variety of systems 
of legitimisation in which people can pursue their interest. When you cannot find a 
solution to your problem in a Catholic church, leave one foot there and put the 
other one in for example an ancestral cult. You go to church in the morning and in 
the evening you go and see the healer. Sociologically speaking it is that 
combination, that capacity to bring together elements taken from a variety of pasts 
and combine it in a way in which you can become an efficient actor in the present 
day society. This in fact is a creative process. Our task today is to combine all 
those elements to produce a political subject who is part of a world in which he or 
she is efficient. We have to reconcile our pluriformity if we want to be effective in 
the world today.  
 
Audience 
Why are we not doing that? Why are we not combining those elements? We are 
still listening to others. When the West is asking for democracy, you go and 
establish democracies. When they ask NGOs, you make sure you have them. When 
they ask IMF, you accept that money. Why don’t we do what we think is best for 
us?  
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Achille M’bembe  
I think we are doing it, on sides where you would least expect it. For example in 
terms of languages. The French they speak in Abidjan, is not the same as the 
French they speak in Paris. It is not the same as the languages of the ordinary of 
Abidjan. It is a mixture of something absolutely African. Just like the Pidgin they 
speak in Lagos or Douala. In the same way we are combining elements of 
governance. In the West of Cameroon you can see a reinvention of Chiefdoms, 
with a set of elements; titles, investments, new forms of taxation to build schools 
or hospitals. If you go to visit some elites in Abidjan on Friday in their offices, 
they won’t be there. They are all in their original villages, since a variety of 
institutional transactions are going on there. Unfortunately we do not pay enough 
attention to those social dynamics. These people are not waiting for foreign aid. If 
they were waiting for foreign aid, to do what they have to do, they would have 
disappeared a long time ago. Foreign aid is a minimum. People are taking care of 
themselves, through a whole variety of ways we would be inspired to look at. If we 
want to build a new society we have to build it on the basis of those dynamics and 
that creativity.  
Democracy is both a technology of governance and a set of values. It is also 
a system whereby some people are excluded -in the USA e.g. there are many-. The 
violence that is exercised on them by the market is such that, the political rights 
makes them non-citizens. So we can not have a theological understanding of 
democracy. It’s something that is there to make sure that violence is exercised in 
such a way that maybe those who are victims of it, blame it on themselves, or do 
not blame it on the system. It is that method whereby you delegate the exercise of 
violence to instances and institutions which at the end, deresponsibilises everyone. 
This can be a way of finding peace and stability. What we have to do in Africa is to 
see in what way one can shift from that kind of raw violence, where Charles Taylor 
goes to the bush, fights for ten years and then gets elected, to ways of civilising 
violence.  
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5. Final discussion 
 
In this seminar conflicts in Asia, Central America and Africa have been discussed. 
However, Thea Hilhorst is emphasising, we should not only focus on violence. 
Raúl Rosende is optimistic about building a lasting peace in Central America. 
Kingsley de Silva stressed the strong points of the democratic system in his part of 
the world. Achille M’Bembe has mentioned the creativity of people, who are 
looking for room for manoeuvre to reinvent society and social practices. How they 
are trying to accommodate the past in face of the relations with Western countries 
nowadays. Given these sorts of processes and conflicts, where do we go from here? 
Should we proceed within a democratic framework or outside of it? What is the 
role of the state? The final statements of the participants will try and answer these 
questions. 
 
Raúl Rosende 
I want to emphasise the mechanism of international conflict resolution in Central 
America after the end of the Cold War. In discussions at the Clingendael 
conference I have realised a very important element. Central America is perhaps 
one of the parts of the Third World with the lesser identity particularities. Having 
listened to the speakers from South-Asia and Africa I think that the particularities 
in those parts of the world are much stronger than in Central America. In fact we 
may even say that Central America is one of the most “Western” parts of the Third 
World. The colonial history in Central America already started in the 15th century. 
Moreover the influence of the United States in Central America determined a much 
more Western orientation in our societies. This is important in a future perspective, 
since in Central America the kind of state that people ideally want is not really an 
issue. People are familiar with the Western state, with Western representative 
democracy and its values. The issue is more how to complement the state, how to 
improve the institutional capacity of the state. The model of a Western state as 
such is not a topic for discussion.  
 
Kingsley de Silva 
The state capacity of countries in South Asia differs a lot between different 
countries. Where states have the capacity to deal with problems of identity, poverty 
and conflict, there is no need for NGOs to take those responsibilities. Then you are 
providing a parallel set of services.  
 
Thea Hilhorst 
That is quite provoking. You say that the state itself should be strengthened rather 
than NGOs (civil society), which is the trend today. 
 
Achille M’bembe 
It seems to me that in order to determine where do we go from here, we have to 
identify quite clearly what in the African context today is posing the major threats 
to the existence of communities as communities. What are those threats which, if 
we let them develop themselves, will put in jeopardy the very fabric of those 
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societies. One of those threats today lies in the weakening and disintegration of the 
state. There are various reasons why it has come to this. The Western tradition has 
invented three mechanisms for social regulation; one was God. Then they killed 
God at some time and two other mechanisms remained. One is the state and the 
other one the market. Beyond those two Western tradition has not been able to 
imagine any other mechanism. With Western hegemony over the world, we, 
coming from marginal places, we are caught in this kind of dictatorship of dualism 
between the state and the market. The last fifteen years we have seen an assault, 
calculated, organised towards a dismantling of the state all over the world, 
including Europe. The effects of which, in places like ours, are quite dramatic. 
Where the state has collapsed and where anarchy has emerged possibilities of 
violent death have increased. Therefore the possibilities of social relations and the 
norms have changed. Now we need to reinvent the state; not the kinds of states we 
had before. We need states that are capable to provide security for people. Security 
and protection have become major issues.  
The second thing is that where the state has disintegrated there also has 
been anarchy and violence; but not everywhere. There are also places where there 
has been a total atomisation of the society, an organisation around micro entities, 
small autonomous institutions that today are there and then disappear. NGOs have 
come and have tried to build on that, but you can not build a society that is so 
fragmented with no central force to organise collective life and public interest. 
There is something to do there which is something totally different from the 
romantisation of civil society or NGO organisations which is prevalent today in 
most parts of our discourse. We need to have a realistic approach on how to rebuild 
civil society and institutions. 
 
Jeroen de Zeeuw 
It is also important, especially when discussing issues of identity and ethnicity, that 
people have the room and possibility to discuss these issues on the local level. That 
is where the strengthening should be. Here in Holland you often hear that a lot of 
people are not interested in politics, as they say that it is beyond their reach, that 
they do not have any influence on political processes. That is where the problem is. 
Not only in African villages or in South-Asia or Central America, but also in 
Western Europe, more discussion has to be at the local level. 
 
Jude Kehla 
Concerning the state, I think that one of the problems in Africa is that in many 
cases the state was actually too big. We should find ways of making the state 
smaller, to take it back to its main task and make it more accountable.  
What to do next? I believe that you should resolve costs where they occur. 
For example, when there is a violent conflict you should be able to let those people 
pay for the costs they cause, things they destroy so not the international 
community. Second is the point of judicial responsibility; people should pay for 
crimes they have committed. It is time we have means for making people 
responsible for acts committed while in government, like Pinochet.  
What I want to say is that it is extremely important that you should write 
down what people’s rights actually are. 
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Audience 
Where and how should the institutional capacity of the state be strengthened? Is it 
a question of the state that has to perform better or is it a question of the 
representativeness of the state and its governance; is it a question of legitimacy of 
the state in several ways? In the whole context of the state being dismantled how 
are we going to work in these directions? 
 
Jude Kehla 
Regarding the last question, for me I would be very much satisfied if you have, 
what we are calling, a constitutional state. If only the state in Africa would obey its 
own laws to begin with.  
 
Audience 
We should not place democracy in a vacuum, it is related to other things. It is 
connected to some kind of model of development, which does not always fit the 
majority. Democracy can be part of future solutions to problems, but not only that. 
We should pay attention to the model of development too.  
 
Thea Hilhorst 
Something has changed. A few years ago, everybody would always talk about 
strengthening civil society. Now, when we ask five people for comments, the 
answer is strengthening the state. That is quite a change in atmosphere. However, 
that leaves open a number of other questions. How can the state be strengthened, 
and what exactly do we need to strengthen? However vague it is, some reinvention 
of the state has to be done. Additionally, we need to reinvent the market and even 
the concept of development as well. Then there still are many other elements that 
have an effect on the state, like the environment. How can we in the future deal 
with minorities, who want to express their identity within the context of the state? 
This means that we have to ask ourselves how far we can go in allowing people to 
express their identity. What we need is a rethinking of the state.  
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6. Some observations by the editors 
 
The seminar was preceded by two student debates about the very concept of 
democracy. In the process of organising the debates and the seminar, a position 
paper and reader were produced. In this process the very idea and practice of 
democracy have been discussed intensely. Referring to the contents of the seminar 
and some literature on the topic Jeroen de Zeeuw and Gemma Vriens will give 
their personal view on some of the remaining questions of the seminar.  
 
 
Jeroen de Zeeuw: Strengthening the state and the role of the 
international community in Central America; Betting the right 
horse? 
 
Jeroen de Zeeuw will discuss whether the state should be strengthened in the 
democratisation process, bearing in mind that the same state has played a major 
role in triggering conflicts in Central America. However, betting only on civil 
society might not be such a good idea either. 
 
As made clear in the presentation by Raúl Rosende and the articles of Jenny Pearce 
and Rafael López-Pintor, the state in Central America has for decades been 
equivalent to the army. The strong military presence both at ground level in rural and 
urban areas and its political representation at government level has had a pervasive 
effect on Central American society. If we take the history of Guatemala as an 
example, we can see that of all presidents in office from 1960 onwards -the year in 
which the 36-year war between the army and its paramilitary squads and insurgent 
movements like the Rebel Armed Forces- only two of them, Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo 
and Jorge Serrano Elias entered office through fair elections2. Other presidents were 
either put in place directly by the military elite in the government or managed to take 
power through fraudulent elections or coup d’états. Civilian government officials 
were merely puppets of the military elite, who catered mainly for their own interests 
and that of the economic elite. This militarisation of the political system also had its 
effects on the entire society. All forms of popular protest and organisation were 
violently oppressed. Not until 1987, with the signing of the Esquipulas II Accord by 
five Central American countries, it was possible to conceive of a cease-fire between 
the military government and the Unidad Nacional Revolucionaria Guatemalteca -
URNG, the structure formed by the four rebel movements in 1982. The period of civil 
war finally came to an end at December 29th, 1996 with the signing of the Agreement 
on a Firm and Lasting Peace, the last of the so-called “Peace Accords”. 
 The role of the international community has been very important in 
facilitating the negotiation of such a peace agreement. As Raúl Rosende rightly states, 
the international pressure towards the military governments regarding the violation of 
human rights has probably been instrumental in the whole peace process. In his article 
                                                 
2
   Clingendael report on “Causes of Conflict in Central America: Guatemala”, Causes of 
Conflict in the Third World Project, Netherlands, Institute of International Relations, 
Clingendael, The Hague. 
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“Foreign assistance in the peace process in Central America”, Raúl Rosende is highly 
optimistic about the future role that the international community could, and to his 
opinion, should play in promoting democratisation and the strengthening of the state 
in Central American countries. 
 However, we must not forget that that same international community, 
especially the US, also played a crucial role in fostering the Guatemalan conflict. 
Backed by the CIA, a mercenary army overthrew the democratically elected 
government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in 1954, which was the beginning of a long 
and violent period of military rule. Assistance provided by the international 
community during that period has mainly consisted of financial aid to the military, as 
Kees Biekart argues. This can also be concluded from Jenny Pearce’s article for the 
entire Central American region: 
“President Reagan took office in January 1981 with a declared intent of 
turning back the tide of communism in the US backyard. (..) Legal and 
illegal methods were used by the US government in a bid to overthrow  
[communist regimes and insurgent movements]” (Pearce, 1998: 587-588). 
So in praising the role of the international community we also have to be aware of the 
actual role it played earlier in the history of a particular conflict.  
 Another interesting point is that in Raúl Rosende’s as well as in Kingsley de 
Silva’s presentation, attention is drawn primarily to strengthening the democratic 
state institutions. This should be done both at the policy level as well as at the local 
level. Strengthening the state is considered to be one of the key elements in the 
process of ending the violence and encouragement of democratisation.  Both speakers 
focused attention on helping state institutions to become more democratic, transparent 
and responsive to the interests of the poor, who in a country like Guatemala comprise 
more than 80 % of the population, the majority of which comes from rural, 
indigenous areas.  
 This emphasis on strengthening the state is rather striking, since the topic of 
recent discussions on democratisation and the subsequent renewal of the state, mostly 
centres around the role and importance of the ‘civil society’, consisting of all kinds of 
associational activities and local grass-roots organisations aimed at empowering 
people from the local level.  Again, in her article Jenny Pearce argues that e.g.  
“The peace process in Guatemala has reflected the new wave of discussion 
on the need to strengthen citizens’ organisational capacities as a means of 
democratising the state and delivering development” (Pearce, 1998: 612).  
Considered from this angle it somewhat amazes that two speakers solely emphasise 
the importance of strengthening the state in the process of democratisation. It has to 
be remembered that the state in the first place created an undemocratic and 
authoritarian society. Stimulating the capacities of the local population seems to be a 
requisite for a balanced and equitable democratisation process.  
“The legitimisation of autonomous and voluntary organisations which is 
implicit in the discourse around ‘civil society’  is an important step 
forward for a region which has only recently won freedom of expression 
and association, and where civil rights are accepted only reluctantly by 
conservative civilian and military elites” (Pearce, 1998: 613).  
On the other hand, if this preference for an institutional reinforcement of the state 
results from scepticism about the concept of ‘civil society’, we indeed have to be 
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aware of the danger of idolising the area of social life where all sorts of grass roots 
activities take place. To pretend that the enormous amount of different local 
organisations could lead to a coherent policy, is quite naive. ‘Civil society’ is not a 
homogeneous group of organisations which all reflect the needs of the local 
population. On the contrary, these organisations often have conflicting interests and 
rarely form a united front.  In this respect I again like to join the opinion of Jenny 
Pearce:  
“There is a danger, however, that ‘civil society’ as used by international 
donors in Central America reifies the concept as something essentially 
homogeneous, and its strengthening as a ‘win-win’ process for all that can 
only contribute positively to democracy and development. Viewed thus, it 
may become just a series of projects, which, as they compete for donor 
funds, look more towards donor agendas than to the social and political 
dynamic of their own societies and to their own capacities to bring about 
change without funding from outside” (Pearce, 1998: p613-614).  
In this way these local-level organisations may become more of an answer to the 
needs of donor organisations, rather than interest promoting organisations that have 
been built from within.  
 Also, it is not a case of exclusively promoting either ‘civil society’ or the 
state. It is equally important to help state institutions prepare themselves for greater 
participation by non-governmental and indigenous organisations, by promoting fair 
elections or emphasising the renewal of the state. Therefore, both strengthening of the 
state and the ‘civil society’ will be needed to benefit from their different 
contributions. Just as democracy can not be achieved by merely some grass roots 
ideas of ideal governance, state pressure towards a dominant form of governance is 
not working either.   
 Concluding, we can say that although the international community can do 
some of the pioneering work by stimulating and guiding the state as well as the ‘civil 
society’ in the difficult process of democratisation, eventually it is the people 
themselves who should be the real pioneers. In other words it should clearly be an 
endogenous process of government officials and the local population, as can be 
extracted from López-Pintor’s comment:  
“If the purpose is to achieve the electoral stage of a peace process after 
effective mobilisation and disarmament of contenders, the political 
performance of local actors, as well as the quality performance of the 
international community and its organisations, is much more important 
than the sheer size and duration of the international interventions” (López-
Pintor, 1997: 60).  
In the end it is the success of the process of democratisation which counts, not the 
amount of money which can be generated by the international community. 
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Gemma Vriens: Conflicts; the path to an African future? 
 
Gemma Vriens is studying Rural Development Studies at the Wageningen 
Agricultural University and is one of the co-ordinators of OtherWise-
interdisciplinary research and education on sustainable development-. This paper 
is not only questioning the value of imposed democracies in Africa, it also asks 
whether we should accept conflicts as a part of the solution of its present day 
problems.     
 
Before the big democratisation wave on the continent in 1989/1990, only four 
African countries had established multi-party democracies: Senegal, the Gambia, 
Botswana and Mauritius. In the beginning of the 1990’s, the combined pressure on 
one-party states from domestic constituencies and from aid donors became 
irresistible. Virtually all states adopted new multi-party constitutions. (Ellis, 1995).  
 Achille M’Bembe in his speech is not only questioning, but also strongly 
criticising these imposed democracies, which are very often no more than a 
structure with no content. In contrast with Raúl Rosende and Kingsley de Silva, 
who are satisfied with the imported Western liberal democratic model, M’Bembe 
suggests to start from scratch, and to formulate a new framework or paradigm to 
rebuild an African system of governance. This should include an African system of 
conflict resolution. 
 Several authors are concerned with the question of a possible African style 
of governance. Patrick Chaball (1998) maintains, for example, that parliamentary 
democracy is suitable for the African situation. He takes a quite moderate 
viewpoint, by describing three proofs for political liberalisation. He sees the end of 
the one-party- political system, the emerging political competition and the first free 
and multiparty elections as a positive trend towards a good system of governance 
in Africa. According to him, democracy should be about parliamentary elections, 
which are, however, in themselves no guarantees of a well-grounded system of 
political accountability. 
 Stephen Ellis (1996), on the other hand, rejects the “IMF and World Bank 
recipe of free markets and liberal politics”. According to Ellis, this recipe is 
bringing neither prosperity nor peace to Africa. This is not because Africans do not 
want good governance, but it reflects the fact that a system of governance is not 
achieved by exhortation. Ottaway (1997) also rejects the view that democratic 
transformation can take place only through what she calls “The Leninist option”; 
namely “the manipulation of the political process, and more fundamentally of the 
entire society”. Imposition of democracy is a contradictio in terminis; it 
automatically leads to an authoritarian regime, in this case an authoritarian regime 
of the IMF, World Bank and donor countries. 
 Most authors do write critically about governance in Africa. They 
nevertheless use a Western paradigm to study the practice of African politics. They 
criticise external imposition, but they do not really present alternatives, neither do 
they learn from African initiatives that have already taken place. Maybe Ake 
(1998) comes a bit closer by breaking with liberal democracy.  
“Liberal democracy, which pretends to be universal, actually is history-
specific. It is a child of industrial civilisation, a product of a socially 
atomised society where production and exchange are already 
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commodified, a society that is essentially a market. It is this product of a 
society in which interests are so particularised that the very notion of 
common interests becomes problematic. Hence the imperative of 
democracy”.  
Western European history is not African history. Both Ake and M’Bembe call for 
an African framework to study African Affairs.  
 Ake makes a first small move towards this paradigm. Governance in 
Africa, according to him, should de-emphasise abstract political rights and stress 
concrete economic rights. The demand for democracy in Africa draws much of its 
impetus from the prevailing economic conditions within. The rejection of Western 
atomised society comes in line with the emphasis on the important link between 
the individual and the community that is prevalent in African society. M’Bembe is 
referring to a reactivation of older social practices (for example rotating credit 
systems) building on a social memory that has always been there, but has been 
suppressed by the colonial and post-colonial state. 
 During colonial and post-colonial times, African societies were basically 
ruled on external initiatives. Africa needs time to internalise parts of these external 
systems, adapt them to an own African way of governance, including local 
authority structures like the chieftaincies in, for example, Zambia. According to 
Ellis (1996): 
“Of paramount importance in Africa is the way in which foreign and local 
pressures and interests combine in the formation of institutions, including 
the new political institutions of democracy”.  
It is like making cocktails: put in all different kind of elements from inside 
and outside, shake it heavily and than come up with something that is typically 
African: an own system of governance. This, however, does not happen smoothly. 
With the shaking of the cocktail, conflicts do occur. The widespread evidence that 
Africans are dissatisfied with the current situation, and that they want change does 
not imply that conditions per se are favourable for a new system of governance. On 
the contrary, conflicts are likely to arise. Not only the number of countries with 
multi-party elections has risen; the number of intra-state conflicts has drastically 
increased as well. In countries like Liberia, Somalia and Sierra Leone one can 
hardly speak of a present state authority, let alone a democratically chosen 
government.  
 But than again, as was questioned during the seminar, is conflict always a 
bad thing? Should we always try to prevent, mitigate and solve conflicts? Conflicts 
might be a bitter but effective tool to change the status quo in a certain country. 
Conflicts express the tensions. Established institutions loose their legitimacy and 
are forced to adapt to their changing environment.  
 The political reality of most African countries today does indeed suggest 
that democratisation can only be the result of conflict (…). “Democratisation could 
only emerge from the kind of disruptive struggle for which little, if any, external 
assistance is likely to be forthcoming” (Ottoway, 1997). Ottaway is referring to 
Dahrendorff (1967) who stated that: “Democracy is government by conflict”. It 
recognises the inevitability of conflicting interests and establishes procedures and 
mechanisms for their regulation. Kingsley de Silva in his speech also states that 
one cannot assume that democracy could be run without conflicts.  
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Should we then accept conflicts, however violent they can be? Should the 
international community sit down and watch what happens in Sierra Leone, 
Angola, Somalia, Eritrea, Algeria, Sudan, Liberia, not wanting to interfere in 
internal affairs? The first question to be answered is: Who is benefiting from 
violent conflicts on the continent? Local grassroots organisations striving for 
improvement of socio-economic conditions and human rights, child soldiers, 
farmers and the local shopkeeper are certainly not amongst the beneficiaries. If 
conflicts reflect tensions within a certain country, are those tensions not primarily 
local elites’ conflicting interests who may support warlords or suppressive 
regimes? And: should we accept the facilitation of war by weapon-exporting 
countries who reap most of the profits?  
I would like to conclude by saying that imposing peace, like imposing 
democracy, is a farce. Authoritarian regimes use repression to create the illusion of 
consensus. An abundance of external pressures to mitigate and solve conflicts in 
Africa can become the same “illusion of consensus”. Conflict resolution, however, 
might be a breaking point. Negotiations should take place at local level where 
conflicting parties and other stakeholders face each other. The role for international 
peacemaking-and keeping forces and solidarity- and peace movements need to be 
reformulated. Pacification can be a point on which people will search for an 
alternative to the present situation, an explicit vision of what a good African 
society should be. To use M’Bembe’s words: “Who they are, where they come 
from, and where they want to go”. It could be a starting point for a new African 
paradigm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For more information about the seminar you can contact Wageningen Disaster 
Studies or one of the editors. The reader from the seminar, with articles about 
governance in conflict areas is still available (costs ƒ 20,=) at OtherWise. 
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